Racial Identity, Group Consciousness, and Attitudes:
A Framework for Assessing Multiracial Self-Classification

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Abstract

Multiracial self-classifiers are the fastest-growing racial population in the U.S. While their rise signals a departure from norms of hypodescent, little is known about the sociopolitical meanings attached to multiracial labels. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding multiracials’ sense of racial group identity, linked fate, and racial attitudes. Examining a national opinion survey that samples more than 1000 multiracial adults, we compare the identity and attitudinal profiles of the two largest multiracial groups in the U.S.—White-Asians and White-Blacks— with those of their component monoracial groups. We find that while White-Asians and White-Blacks often distinguish themselves from their component races, on balance, the assertion of dual racial membership signals greater solidarity and/or affect toward the minority race. These findings suggest that members of these multiracial populations are likely to align themselves relatively more with their minority background than with Whites on political issues that are racial in nature.

Replication Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HFXXEF. A full Code Ocean replication archive is also available at: https://codeocean.com/capsule/0071d269-a531-44d5-8133-cefef619bb91/

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Since the political realignment of the 1930s, racial identity and the resulting political cleavages based on race have been defining features of American politics (Burnham, 1970; Anderson, 1979). However, rapidly changing demographic trends raise the possibility of shifting alignments across race and party divides. This possibility is perhaps most apparent in the emerging multiracial population, which has become the fastest-rising racial demographic in the nation (Davenport, 2018).

The dramatic growth in the U.S. multiracial population suggests shifting patterns of social and political meaning associated with racial identity. Since multiracials straddle groups, they may be subject to cross-pressures, creating a more fluid and context-dependent sense of identity (see, for instance, Westwood and Peterson, 2020; Saperstein and Penner, 2012; Egan, 2020). Because previous work on identity and racial attitudes has concentrated on individuals self-classified with a single racial category, we currently know very little about the underpinnings of multiracials’ group attachments and where they locate themselves on key components of racial identity, group consciousness, and attitudes (McClain et al., 2009; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). Our work is a beginning toward filling this gap in our understanding of the politics of group identity.

By examining the psychology of multiracials’ group identification, our work provides important insights into how racial identity is politicized in contemporary American society. Focusing on the two largest U.S. multiracial groups—White-Blacks and White-Asians—we develop a theoretical framework for locating multiracial self-classification within a continuum of racial identity and beliefs. We generate a set of hypotheses which we test using a rich battery of items embedded into the largest national survey of multiracial adults to date. The breadth of these measures and the size of our multiracial sample (720 White-Blacks and 509 White-Asians)
distinguish our study from previous work, which has typically lacked the data and statistical power to systematically assess the relationship between multiracial labels and racial attitudes.

Our approach allows for more nuanced investigation into the relationship between an individual’s self-classification—the race(s) they check on an official form or survey, with constrained options—and their racial group identity—their internal sense of self, awareness, and group attachment (Roth 2016; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Our results reveal that White-Asians and White-Blacks often distinguish themselves from both of their component racial backgrounds. However, on balance, *self-classification* with multiple races does not reflect an equal connection to and affinity for both constituent racial groups, but rather relatively greater alignment with the minority race. Notably, we find that White-Asians share Asians’ racial attitudes, and White-Blacks express minority group linked fate and pro-Black stereotypes at levels comparable to Blacks. All things considered, we argue that the rise of these multiracial populations is likely to strengthen rather than weaken the longstanding bond between self-identified minorities and the Democratic Party.

We have organized the rest of this paper as follows. First, we describe approaches to racial categorization and our population of interest. Second, we draw on psychological theories of group dynamics to formulate three distinct models of multiracial political identity, and corresponding hypotheses concerning multiracials’ attachments and attitudes. Third, we describe our survey of multiracials and our indicators of group identity, consciousness, and attitudes. Fourth, we present and discuss the results testing the predictions derived from our theoretical models. In closing, we consider the implications of our findings for party politics and polarization.
Identifying “Multiracial” Respondents

A multifaceted construct, race can be conceptualized via many dimensions, including by parentage, phenotype, or self-classification (Roth, 2016). In this paper, we focus on the dimension by which racial data is most commonly collected in the U.S.: self-classification, the race(s) someone marks on a survey. We assign individuals who mark themselves with more than one race as “multiracial” and those who mark a single race as “monoracial.”

We center our attention on White-Asian and White-Black multiracials, who combined make up roughly half of the multiracial-identifying population in the U.S. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2019) and are the most rapidly rising multiple-race groups (Davenport, 2018). Given historical practices of hypodescent for Black and Asian Americans, that multiracial self-classifications are now commonplace for these groups signals an important evolution of racial norms. Although race-mixing is also common among American Indians, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders, and Latinos, we do not examine these groups in this paper. But we hope future research will extend our work by examining how other multiracial identities map on to political outcomes.

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4 Here, we examine people who self-classify with two races, regardless of their racial ancestry. Following prior work, we use the term “multiracial” in reference to self-classification with more than one race (Davenport, 2016), instead of the term “biracial,” which is often used to signal mixed parentage (Rockquemore and Brunsma, 2008).

5 Sampling a sufficient number of American Indian and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander respondents in national surveys is difficult, given these groups’ relatively small percentages of the broader U.S. population. With respect to Hispanic/Latinos, there is disagreement regarding whether this category should be considered a race, an ethnicity, or both (Gonzalez-Barrera and
Models of Multiracial Identity, Consciousness, and Attitudes

Racial group membership is socially and culturally defined, but also constrained by heritage (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007). People who have parents of the same racial background are viewed as having a single race in their repertoire of social identities, whereas those with parents of different backgrounds may be seen as having multiple racial choices. Yet identities are not locked to parentage; having interracial parents is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for self-classification as multiracial (Harris and Sim, 2002).

In understanding how self-classification with multiple racial groups translates to political outcomes, we must first unpack the significance of these group identities (Lee 2008). We conceptualize variability in multiracials’ attachments by drawing upon behavioral theories of group dynamics. Most notably, Social Identity Theory (SIT) maintains that individuals’ affiliation with particular social groups powerfully shapes their attitudes and behaviors (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Hogg and Hardie 1992). Identification with a social category is a crucial determinant of whether an individual will use that category to define herself (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1997). According to Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), a complement to Social Identity Theory, when people categorize themselves as part of a larger group, they center their attitudes and actions on Lopez, 2015). As a consequence, there is ambiguity around the meaning of a “White Latino” label.

An abundance of scholarship (e.g., Khanna 2004; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2008) has examined how mixed-race individuals self-identify, finding that familial characteristics, social networks and environment, gender, and appearance influence which racial identities are developed, formed, or validated.
the expectations and objectives of this in-group (Turner et al., 1987). As social identities become salient, individuals take on the opinions and behaviors of fellow in-group members and seek greater social distance from out-group members (Huddy, 2013). Identification with social groups also has meaningful political implications, providing a pathway to political resources, shaping attitudes, and structuring behavior such as voting, collective action, and intergroup conflict (Huddy 2001; White and Laird 2020).

Importantly, identities that are acquired, or selected into, tend to be stronger than those that are assigned by others (Huddy 2013). By self-classifying with more than one race, multiracials assert subjective membership in plural racial groups. Yet such labeling does not necessarily mean a comparable sense of regard for each group; for instance, people who mark themselves as White-Asian may feel more strongly connected to Asians than to Whites. Because their self-classification includes both minority (e.g., Asian or Black) and majority (White) racial ancestry, we argue that multiracials’ identities, consciousness, and attitudes may follow any of three general paradigms.

**Minority Solidarity Model**

According to SIT, individuals are more likely to self-identify with a group if the group’s boundaries are seen as less penetrable and there is a higher frequency of being externally classified as a member of the group, for example, due to physical cues such as skin color (Huddy, 2001). This is relevant for multiracials because historically, hypodescent was used to categorize mixed-race Black children and mixed-race Asian children as singularly Black or Asian, respectively (Daniel 2010; Bureau of the Census 1930). While hypodescent does not officially delineate racial group membership today, recent research points to the rule’s longevity in informally structuring racial classification, as White-Asian and White-Black biracials are more likely to be externally categorized as “minority” than as White (Roberts and Gelman 2017; Peery and Bodenhausen
Continued categorization with their minority race may lead multiracials to feel a greater political connection to that background; because multiracials either cannot or do not wish to seek entry into the dominant White category, their non-whiteness becomes salient, strengthening the contrast with Whites and their bond to their racial minority group.

Furthermore, in keeping with SIT, social identity is motivated by a need for positive distinctiveness, by which one’s in-group is favorably differentiated from out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). When minority and majority groups are hierarchically arrayed, a group’s sense of distinctiveness is tied to its position in the social order—and lower-ranked minority group members will identify with their in-group by asserting greater distinctiveness from higher-ranked outgroups (Pérez, Deichert and Engelhardt, 2019). Optimal distinctiveness suggests that building political cohesion is a challenge for those belonging to sizeable majority groups for whom identity is insufficiently distinctive, as well as members of small minority groups for whom identity is excessively distinctive and inadequately communal (Huddy, 2013). In light of this, we argue that adopting a multiracial label while simultaneously expressing a psychological and political affinity to their monoracial minority race can enable individuals to meet the needs posited by optimal distinctiveness theory: validation and acceptance within a group, and uniqueness and distinction (Brewer, 1991). Our Minority Solidarity Model (H1) thus predicts that multiracial Americans feel most strongly attached to and feel most positively inclined toward their minority community.

**Hegemonic Model**

Alternatively, our Hegemonic Model posits that multiracials feel most strongly connected to the dominant majority group—White—than to their racial minority community. Although the category “white” has historically omitted individuals who were not of exclusively European ancestry (Haney-Lopez, 2006), the definition of whiteness may be loosening to include some
people of mixed-race (Saperstein and Penner 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2002). White-minority intermarriage is correlated with social class and higher social status may enable people of mixed-race to traverse racial boundaries and be classified as White by others (Davenport, 2018). It is thus possible that, as it did for European ethnic groups in the twentieth century, whiteness is evolving into an “achieved” rather than ascribed status for part-White multiracials today.

SIT contends that low status groups may improve their group’s position by engaging in social creativity and social change (Tajfel and Turner, 1979): such individuals for whom membership is permeable may circumvent status deprivation by associating with a different, higher-status group (Berry 2005; Tajfel 1981). In line with this argument, our Hegemonic Model (H2) posits that multiracials perceive self-classification as White-Asian or White-Black as a way of ceding membership in their lower-status minority group and pursuing upward social mobility without fully rebuffing racial norms. Thus multiracials will attach themselves to, and express attitudes more closely toward, Whites as a group.7

Emerging Identity Model

A third possibility is that multiracials’ classification reflects a subjective racial attachment that substantively and consistently deviates from both their constituent backgrounds, a framework we call the Emerging Identity Model (H3). When individuals commit to a novel group affiliation that cuts across deep-rooted boundaries, they endeavor to construct a unique identity by favorably

7 This model can also be traced to the early theorizing of Marx and Gramsci on the self-perpetuating nature of social hierarchies (e.g., Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo 2002), as well as empirical work on the role of pre-adult socialization processes in defending system legitimacy (e.g. Easton and Dennis 1969).
differentiating the in-group from comparative out-groups (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002). According to distinctiveness theory of self-perception, if an individual is distinctive on a particular trait, that trait becomes spontaneously salient as a key component of the self-concept (McGuire and Padawer-Singer, 1976). By adopting a multiracial label, individuals may not only be differentiating themselves from each of their component racial heritages, but also asserting a sense of belonging to a wholly separate and different group.

Pursuant to Bonilla-Silva’s (2004) tri-racial stratification theory, multiracials may occupy an intermediate position in a three-tiered racial order—not White or minority but an entirely different category. Although hypodescent often constrains classification, there is evidence that Americans’ conceptions of racial categories are shifting away from the rule. Individuals of mixed White/non-White backgrounds can be classified in ways that are inconsistent with hypodescent, including as “multiracial” (Chen, 2019) and studies have shown growing public recognition and acceptance of multiracial labels (Citrin, Levy and van Houweling, 2014). In addition, escalating rates of multiracial self-classification indicate a subjective embrace of racial pluralism. We thus hypothesize that, ever mindful of their connection to multiple cultures, multiracials occupy a composite category, separate from Whites and also from their minority background—and profess attachments and beliefs that are unaligned with either group.

**Differences by Multiracial Subgroup**

The specific historical experiences of U.S. racial groups and their relative position in the racial hierarchy shape their identities and, in turn, differences in policy preferences (Masuoka and Junn, 2013). Thus beyond the three models described above, we predict that the effects of multiracials’ identification are moderated by their racial background: White-Asian or White-Black.
While both Asian Americans and Black Americans have been disempowered and excluded, each group encounters prejudice in particular ways. According to Kim’s (2004) theory of racial positionality, racial groups can be ranked on two dimensions: superior/inferior and American/foreigner. Whites are the most privileged group overall. Asian Americans are seen as closer to Whites on superiority but more culturally foreign; in contrast, Blacks are perceived to be inferior but relatively American compared to Asians (Zou and Cheryan, 2017). Both minority groups have been subjected to racism and institutionalized discrimination that fall within the scope of their respective disadvantaged dimensions. Thus, depending on the scale, Asians or Blacks may be seen as proximate to or distant from Whites.

All told, though, the White/Black boundary has been less flexible than the White/Asian boundary. Compared to Blacks, Asian Americans as a panethnic group are less socially distant from Whites and less inclined to subscribe to a racially-based sense of linked fate (Pew 2015; Gay, Hochschild and White 2016). In addition, racial categorization has been more absolute for mixed-race Blacks than for mixed-race Asians (Davis 2001). In light of the relative rigidity of the White/Black boundary, we hypothesize that, all else being equal, White-Blacks will express comparatively stronger minority group attachments than White-Asians (H4).

In addition, we predict some variation by multiracial group based on whether attitudes are measured explicitly or implicitly. Research has shown that individuals belonging to disadvantaged groups explicitly pledge support for their group’s goals, assert positive attitudes about their group, 

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8 As examples, Blacks’ perceived inferiority was used to justify their enslavement, while Asians’ perceived foreignness was used to legitimize the Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the Asian Exclusion Act.
and consciously reject prejudice—yet implicitly disclose negative, or less positive, biases toward their group (Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004). Implicit attitudes, which are involuntary, irrepressible, and below awareness, are shaped by the history of intergroup relations and the social ordering of groups; as a consequence, members of lower-ranked minority groups may reflexively internalize their group’s status and adverse social attitudes toward their group (Devos and Banaji, 2005).

Because Blacks are perceived to be inferior to both Whites and Asians, as a group they are often stereotyped as lazy, lacking intelligence, and violent (Zou and Cheryan, 2017). Given connotations of Blackness with inferiority and theories of stratification that place Blacks at the bottom of the U.S. racial order (Bonilla-Silva 2004), we hypothesize that implicit attitude measures will unmask for White-Black multiracials some underlying racial bias and perceptions of threat, leading to an expression of relatively greater anti-Black bias than seen in explicit measures (H5). We do not anticipate similar implicit anti-Asian bias among White-Asian multiracials. While Asian Americans are often “othered” as foreign, they also encounter presumptions related to their aptitude and are stereotyped as a “model minority” and superior to Whites in academic accomplishment (Zhou, 2004). As a consequence, we predict that anti-Asian associations are likely to be weaker and less ingrained than those associated with Blacks.

By using two distinct sets of measures: simple self-reports and more complex implicit measures (see, for example Pérez, 2013, 2016), we are able to assess whether multiracials’ attitudes are moderated by conscious processing.

Data and Methods

Surveying Multiracial Respondents

Given the relative size of the multiracial population, sampling a sufficient number of these respondents in national surveys presents a major challenge. We overcome the scarcity problem
inherent in random digit dialing studies by oversampling multiracials from YouGov’s large Internet panel, which includes 2 million U.S. participants, enabling the recruitment of more than 1000 multiracial adults. YouGov employs a matching methodology to generate online samples that reflect target populations on key demographic attributes, including age and socioeconomic status.

We conducted our survey in February and March 2015. In sampling multiracials, YouGov first identified every panel member who had marked more than one category when asked: “Which group(s) best describes your race/ethnicity? (If you are of mixed-heritage please choose all that apply.)” The possible responses were White/ Caucasian, Black, Hispanic or Latino, Asian, and Native American. All respondents who indicated their race as White and Black, or White and Asian, were then invited to participate in the survey. We compare White-Black and White-Asian multiracials to their constituent component monoracial identity groups: individuals who marked their race as (only) White, Black, or Asian. In total, our sample includes 720 White-Blacks, 509 White-Asians, 800 Whites, 500 Blacks, and 500 Asians.9

Measuring Racial Identity and Group Consciousness

Racial group identity is an individual’s psychological sense of awareness and attachment to a racial group, built upon an understanding of mutual interests, beliefs, and ideas with other group members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Racial group identity is distinct from racial group consciousness, which is the ideological identification with a racial group—the feeling that one’s personal identity is entwined with that of their in-group, coupled with a belief that collective action is the ideal way for the group to lift its status and advance its interests (McClain et al. 2009; Gurin,

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9 See Table A-1 and Table A-2 for more information on our sample demographics.
Miller and Gurin 1980). Racial group consciousness is hence the politicization of identity; identity is invariably a requisite but insufficient component of group consciousness.

Here, in line with prior research (Turner et al. 1987; McGuire et al. 1978; Gay, Hochschild and White 2016; Harris 1995; Dawson 1994), we deploy three indicators to assess respondents’ racial group identity and consciousness:

1. **Our first measure of identity is the salience of race.** Respondents rated the importance of their race and other nonracial attributes (gender, age, religion, political beliefs, and occupation) “to your sense of personal identity.” Responses ranged from “very important” to “not at all important.” To assess the relative salience of race for each respondent, we took the average importance (scored on a 0 to 1 metric) they attributed to the nonracial attributes and subtracted it from the salience of race. Positive scores indicate that race is assigned greater importance than non-racial attributes (salience).

2. **Second, we examine identity as the degree to which individuals perceive closeness to different racial groups** (“how close do you feel to [Whites/Blacks/Asians]”), with responses ranging from “not at all close” to “very close” (closeness).

3. **Our measure of racial group consciousness derives from linked fate.** White-Black and Black respondents indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement, “as things get better for African-Americans in general, things get better for me.” We directed a parallel question to our Asian and White-Asian respondents (“as things get better for Asian Americans in general...”). Both White-Blacks and White-
Asians, as well as Whites, were asked about their linked fate with Whites (“as things get better for White Americans in general...”) (linked fate).\textsuperscript{10}

**Measuring Racial Attitudes**

We assess racial attitudes with several items that gauge explicit and implicit racial biases.

**Explicit Attitudes: Racial Stereotypes**

Explicit racial prejudice is a belief in the intrinsic inferiority of minority groups. Given the sustained relevance of explicit prejudice on social and political outcomes, we measure it here via racial stereotype endorsement (Huddy and Feldman, 2009). We asked respondents to rate the applicability of a series of positive and negative traits to Blacks, Asians, and Whites. Positive traits included “high achievers in school,” “value work over pleasure,” and “self-reliant.” Negative traits included “lack moral values,” “involved in drugs and gangs,” and “insist on special privileges.” We rescaled the trait ratings to range from 0 to 1 (where 1 is applicability of the trait), averaged across the positive and negative ratings, and then took the difference in the two averages. Positive scores indicate greater applicability of positive over negative traits to the group in question, i.e., more favorable stereotypes (stereotyping).

\textsuperscript{10} Our linked fate measure differs from that used by Dawson (1994), who asks respondents the extent to which they agree or disagree that “what happens to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life,” though we do not think this wording difference poses any substantive implications for our findings. Others have also operationalized linked fate as a feeling of group commonality (Masuoka, 2006) and by shared political interests and perceptions of discrimination against the group (Sanchez, 2006).
Implicit Attitudes: Racial Resentment and Implicit Associations

Although explicit prejudice is an important predictor of sociopolitical behavior, explicit measures are vulnerable to self-monitoring effects (Dasgupta et al., 2000). We thus supplement our stereotype questions with two indicators of implicit attitudes, which are less susceptible to self-monitoring.

The first indicator is the standard four-item racial resentment battery, which is designed to capture more nuanced forms of bias by gauging the degree to which people believe Blacks do not work hard enough to overcome obstacles and that they take things they have not earned (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with statements that Blacks were lacking in work ethic, or conversely, held back by discriminatory practices. We re-scored the items to range from 0 to 1 and calculated the average across items; the higher the score, the more racially resentful the individual (resentment).

While racial resentment is a widely-used measure of implicit prejudice, it risks conflating prejudice with political ideology (Carmines, Sniderman and Easter, 2011). So as a second measure, we implement Brief Implicit Association Tests (BIAT), a barometer of learned racial associations that are instinctively expressed and not subject to cognitive control (Nosek et al., 2014). Given the IAT’s extensive use in social and political psychology studies on race (Pérez 2013; Devos and Banaji 2005), we administer it here as a predictor of racial affect, the psychological concept regarding the experience of feeling or emotion, which is an automatic response to stimuli.

The IAT has repeatedly been shown to be a valid measure of bias (Nosek, Greenwald and Banaji 2005; Greenwald et al. 2009). The IAT bypasses the asking of questions entirely, instead appraising the speed with which individuals associate racial categories, such as Black and White, with words representing good and bad. Implicit racial bias is assessed by subtracting the response
times for “stereotype consistent” pairings (e.g., Black+Bad and White+Good) from the response times for “stereotype incompatible” pairings (e.g., Black+Good and White+Bad). Positive scores on the IAT represent faster associations when Black is paired with Bad, and White with Good (compared to the inverse), while negative values represent faster sorting when Black is paired with Good, and White is paired with Bad. Hence, positive IAT scores represent ingrained or implicit bias against Blacks. An effect size, or “D score,” is calculated for each participant based on this difference (for additional details on scoring, see Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji 2003).

The full version of the IAT takes more than 15 minutes to complete. To minimize the survey length, here we rely on the Brief IAT—the BIAT—which consists of fewer trials and can be completed in under 10 minutes (Nosek et al., 2014).11 We use two BIATs: a White-Black BIAT that measures implicit bias toward Blacks, and a White-Asian BIAT that substitutes Asians for Blacks.12 The scoring protocol is identical across the two BIATs: positive scores represent anti-minority bias and negative scores represent anti-White bias (BIAT).

To summarize, we examine two sets of racial attitudes—explicit and implicit—in order to estimate multiracials’ affinity (or lack thereof) toward their constituent racial groups. This diverse and integrative measurement approach enables a robust assessment of racial attitudes. In all cases,

11 The BIAT is psychometrically similar to standard IAT measures of the same constructs, and a successful measure of implicit stereotypes. For further details on the BIAT and its scoring procedure, see Sriram and Greenwald (2009).

12 In the White-Asian BIAT, the target group categories are represented by faces of Asian and White males (the identical White faces used in the White-Black BIAT), while the positive and negative words remain the same.
we evaluate the identity or attitudinal distance between multiracials on the one hand, and the monoracial groups that define them on the other.

**Analysis and Results**

For our results, we present frequency distributions for each of the five racial groups. To isolate the predictive effect of racial self-classification on our dependent variables (race salience, closeness, linked fate, stereotypes, racial resentment, and BIAT), we also estimate OLS regression models that account for respondent age, education, gender, income, and region, and we show percentage point differences between groups that remain after adjusting for sociodemographic differences.\(^{13}\) We recode all dependent variables to range between -1 and 1 or 0 and 1.

**Racial Identity and Group Consciousness**

Table 1 displays the weighted percentage of respondents at each level of the salience, closeness, and linked fate variables. Race is a far more salient identity for multiracials, Blacks, and Asians, than it is for Whites. Compared to Whites, White-Blacks are 32 percentage points more likely, and White-Asians are 26 percentage points more likely, to report having a salient racial identity (when pooling the top two levels of importance). While multiracials say they feel similarly close to each of their two component groups, they are far more likely to express a sense of linked fate with their minority race than with Whites.

Since the five groups vary demographically, these differences in racial identity outcomes may not be entirely due to racial self-classification; for instance, education may also affect how salient one considers their racial identity to be. To ascertain the direct effect of race, we present group differences that are derived from multivariate regression models.

\(^{13}\) Full regression tables are available in the Supplemental Information, Appendix B.
Relative Salience of Racial Identity

Figure 1 displays the effect of racial self-classification on the salience of racial identity (relative to other social identities) after accounting for demographic differences using OLS regression. It shows that both White-Blacks ($\beta = 0.20, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.16, 0.24]$) and White-Asians ($\beta = 0.19, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.15, 0.23]$) are significantly more likely than Whites to see race as relatively important to their sense of identity. All else being equal, White-Blacks are somewhat less likely than Blacks to feel that race is an important component of identity ($F = 11.726, p < 0.001$), and White-Asians are similarly less likely to feel this than Asians ($F = 22.24, p < 0.001$). Importantly, although multiracials report lower levels of racial salience than monoracial minorities, they are approximately twice as far from monoracial Whites as they are from monoracial minorities. All told, then, these findings show multiracials fall in-between their component groups (consistent with H3), though are considerably more similar to their minority race.

Figure 1 indicates that White-Blacks and White-Asians are far more likely than Whites to think of themselves in racial terms. But these findings alone cannot speak to whether those salient racial identities are singularly White, singularly minority, or distinctly multiracial. Examining multiracials’ sense of racial group closeness and linked fate shed light on this question.

Racial Group Closeness

We now consider the perceived closeness of each racial group to different races. Because the full sample was asked about closeness to Whites, Blacks, and Asians, we compare multiracials to their monoracial counterparts in each target group (e.g., closeness to Whites for all groups, relative to White respondents). Figure 2(a) shows that, relative to Whites, White-Blacks and
White-Asians are significantly less likely to perceive themselves as close to Whites, all else being equal. In Figure 2(b) we see that relative to Blacks, White-Blacks also report feeling lower levels of closeness to Blacks ($\beta = 0.07, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.10, 0.04]$). Figure 2(c) shows that relative to Asians, White-Asians report lower levels of closeness to Asians ($\beta = 0.05, 95\% \text{ CI}[0.08, 0.01]$). Thus White-Blacks and White-Asians are distinct from both of their component racial backgrounds on this measure, again providing support for the Emerging Identity Model (H3). 

[Figure 2 about here]

**Racial Linked Fate**

When it comes to multiracial’s linked fate, Figure 3(a) shows that both White-Blacks and White-Asians are significantly less likely than Whites to believe that their individual well-being is tied to that of Whites. Figure 3(b) further shows that White-Blacks’ expressed linked fate to Blacks is indistinguishable from monoracial Blacks (supporting H1). Figure 3(c) shows that White-Asians express lower levels of Asian group linked fate than monoracial Asians (supporting H3). This suggests that White-Asians do not perceive as strong a shared culture and experience with Asians, perhaps due to multiracials’ relatively greater distance from the immigrant experience, and their lower likelihood of speaking Asian languages and affiliating with religions commonly practiced by Asians (Davenport, 2016). However, the linked fate difference here between White-Asians and Asians is substantively small ($\beta = -0.04, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.08, -0.01]$), placing White-Asians slightly closer to Asians than to Whites ($\beta = 0.06, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.10, 0.02]$), though this difference is not significant.\(^{14}\)

[Figure 3 about here]

\(^{14}\) This finding draws on an analysis in Davenport, Franco and Iyengar (2021).
Extrapolating across these indicators of racial group identity and consciousness, it is apparent that both multiracial groups consistently differentiate themselves from Whites, thus demonstrating no support for our Hegemonic Model (H2). On our two measures of identity—salience and racial group closeness—we find support for the Emerging Identity Model (H3) for both White-Asians and White-Blacks. Even so, on racial identity salience, multiracials are not equally torn between Whites and their minority race, and are relatively more aligned with their minority race. Notably, the two multiracial populations diverge on group consciousness: Whereas White-Asians perceive similar levels of linked fate with both of their constituent backgrounds (H3), White-Blacks are more likely to draw upon the social position of Blacks—not Whites—as a stand-in for their own well-being (H4). Thus when White-Blacks’ racial group identity becomes politicized in the form of group consciousness, we see clear support for the Minority Solidarity Model (H1)—a finding that may be attributed to the history of racial discrimination, exclusion, and feelings of commonality that White-Black multiracials share with Blacks (Dawson 1994; Davis 2001).

Importantly, although we consistently find support for Emerging Identity among White-Asians on identity and group consciousness, we show in the analyses that follow that this self-reported median position is not reflected in their racial attitudes. Here, we find White-Asians separate themselves from Whites and are indistinguishable from Asians, all else being equal.

Racial Attitudes and Affect

Turning to the racial attitude and affect measures shown in Table 2, we see that, again, multiracials express attitudes more akin to and favorable toward their constituent minority race than to Whites. For example, White-Asians and White-Blacks report more positive stereotypes of Asians and Blacks, respectively, than they do of Whites. The notable exception is White-Blacks’
BIAT scores, which fall between Whites and Blacks; without accounting for covariates, White-Blacks’ D− score is .14 point lower than that of Whites (a substantively significant difference), and .09 point higher than Blacks (also a highly significant difference).\textsuperscript{15} We examine this finding in greater depth below.

[Table 2 about here]

\textbf{Explicit Attitudes: Racial Stereotypes}

When it comes to racial stereotypes, OLS regression estimates in Figure 4(a) show that relative to White respondents, all other racial groups hold less positive views of Whites—and that multiracials’ views are statistically indistinguishable from their corresponding monoracial minority group.\textsuperscript{16} Regarding Black stereotypes, Figure 4(b) shows that White-Blacks have strongly favorable stereotypes of Blacks and are, indeed, commensurate with those held by Black respondents ($\beta = 0.01$, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.06]). Thus in their conscious social generalizations of Whites and Blacks, White-Blacks express views equivalent to their Black counterparts. Figure 4(c) shows that White-Asians are, in fact, even more positive toward Asians than monoracial Asians ($\beta = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.11]).

All told, on this measure of explicit racial attitudes—those broad stereotypic judgments of which respondents are cognizant—we find support for the Minority Solidarity Model (H1): both

\textsuperscript{15} Recall that D−scores reveal the implicit associations in memory of respondents. Scores greater than zero in our setup indicate pro-White and anti-minority response biases, while scores less than zero indicate pro-minority and anti-White biases.

\textsuperscript{16} We constructed a single index by re-coding the stereotype measures to a common scale and then took the average.
multiracial groups report views akin to and more favorable toward their corresponding minority group than toward Whites.

[Figure 4 about here]

**Racial Attitudes and Affect: Racial Resentment and Implicit Associations**

Compared to the stereotype questions, racial resentment represents a less malevolent view of Blacks. Rather than asking whether respondents associate low academic achievement, immorality, and criminality with Blacks, the questions constituting the resentment index inquire about beliefs regarding Blacks’ commitment to the work ethic and self-help. Thus while respondents are aware of the racialized nature of the questions, an expression of resentment is more ambiguously racial than the endorsement of an unequivocally negative racial stereotype.\(^{17}\)

As illustrated in Figure 5(a), both multiracial groups report a level of racial resentment toward Blacks that is lower than Whites. Although White-Asians report significantly less racial resentment than Whites, they are statistically indistinct from Asians (\(F = 1.7, p = .19\)), in consonance with our Minority Solidarity Model (H1).\(^{18}\) On the other side of the racial divide, Blacks and White-Blacks express half to two-thirds the level of anti-Black resentment as Whites, though White-Blacks disclose significantly higher levels of resentment than Blacks (\(F = 18.39, p < .001\)), evidence that supports our Emerging Identity Model (H3). Comparing the two multiracial groups, we see that White-Asians express strikingly higher levels of racial resentment overall than White-Blacks (H4).

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\(^{17}\) We constructed a single index by taking the average of the four constituent items.

\(^{18}\) Asians are indistinguishable from Whites (\(\beta = -0.03, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.07, 0.00]\)).
Finally, we turn to implicit racial associations, as measured in the White-Asian and White-Black BIATs. Regression estimates presented in Figure 5(b) show that relative to Whites, White-Asian multiracials express far less negative implicit biases toward Asians, at a level that is indistinguishable from monoracial Asians (F=.38, p=.54)—providing support for Minority Solidarity (H1). Figure 5(c) presents results from the White-Black BIAT and shows that, relative to Whites, White-Black multiracials harbor significantly less negative implicit views toward Blacks; however, White-Blacks are also significantly less positive toward Blacks than are monoracial Blacks (F=8.67, p < .01)—consistent with Emerging Identity (H3).

Thus White-Blacks and White-Asians show some opposing patterns in their group alignment on indicators of implicit racial attitudes. Whereas White-Asians consistently respond as Asians (in line with the Minority Solidarity Model), White-Blacks sit between Blacks and Whites on implicit associations and racial resentment—though they fall nearer to Blacks on the latter measure. These results support our hypothesis that, for White-Blacks, implicit attitudinal measures reveal relatively greater anti-Black attitudes than those disclosed by explicit measures (H5). Since individuals assess their in-groups more positively than their out-groups (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles and Monteith, 2003), that White-Blacks’ implicit racial attitudes lie between those of Whites and Blacks suggests that they may view both Whites and Blacks as being part of their in-group and that, subconsciously, they do not prefer one group over the other—a finding that comports with White-Blacks’ reported equivalent feelings of closeness to both groups. Alternatively, these results could indicate that while White-Blacks express pro-Black stereotypes, their higher scores on racial resentment and the BIAT (compared to Blacks) signals anti-Black prejudices of which they are less cognizant. While we cannot adjudicate between these interpretations with our data, we think that this is an important question for future research.
Discussion

We have provided the first large-scale assessment of the racial identities, consciousness, and attitudes of multiracial self-classifiers, focusing on the two largest groups in the population: White-Blacks and White-Asians. At the outset, we put forth three competing identity paradigms: the Minority Solidarity Model, the Hegemonic Model, and the Emerging Identity Model. All told, results show no support for the Hegemonic Model (H2), that multiracials principally align themselves with Whites. A mix of evidence favors the Minority Solidarity Model (H1) and Emerging Identity Model (H3). In general, though, we find that despite labeling themselves as White-Black or White-Asian, multiracial identifiers stake out an identity and/or express attitudes more similar to their minority race.

While White-Asians generally evince equal proximity to their component groups on measures of identity and linked fate, they are akin to Asians on racial attitudes; they are also far more likely than Whites to say race is a salient component of their identity. Both consciously and subconsciously, White-Asians assert a stronger affiliation with Asians than with Whites. Minority solidarity is also pronounced for White-Blacks, who respond like Blacks when inquired about linked fate and stereotypes, and are much closer to Blacks than to Whites on racial resentment and race salience.

Yet on racial group closeness and the BIAT, White-Blacks are directly in between their component races, findings that necessitate elaboration. First, in contrast to their linked fate responses, which clearly accord with Blacks, White-Blacks report feeling equally close to both of their component races. Since racial group closeness is a measure of subjective identification
strength and psychological attachment (Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980), White-Blacks’ responses taken together indicate that they perceive a comparable affinity to their racial heritages—but that this affinity is not politicized into a sense that their individual well-being is equally intertwined with Whites and Blacks.

Second, in keeping with H5, we find that White-Blacks express positive explicit attitudes toward Blacks in the stereotype measure, but implicitly show some relative anti-Black bias in the BIAT.¹⁹ This suggests White-Blacks may hold some prejudices of which they are unaware. It is not obvious that these implicit racial biases are grounded in hostility; this result, coupled with multiracials’ reported closeness to Whites, may be a byproduct of continual reminders that whiteness is more revered in American society (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles and Monteith, 2003) and reflect multiracials’ recognition that they live in a culture where Blacks are treated as secondary to Whites (Karpinski and Hilton, 2001).²⁰ Relatedly, less favorable implicit associations toward Blacks may be due to repeated contact with anti-Black stereotypic images (Devine, 1989). Because White-Black multiracials live in less segregated areas (Davenport, 2016), they have, on average, fewer interpersonal interactions with Blacks and may be more likely to internalize negative latent images of them.

We also find some differences in multiracials’ attitudes that are tied to their particular background. Compared to White-Blacks, White-Asians express relatively greater linked fate to

¹⁹ This result comports with other work that finds a disconnect between one’s self-reported explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes toward the same target (Devos and Banaji, 2005).

²⁰ This is supported by research showing that monoracial Blacks also often favor Whites at the implicit level (Livingston 2002).
Whites and markedly higher levels of anti-Black stereotyping and resentment. This indicates limited support for H4, that White-Blacks identify more strongly as racial minorities than do White-Asians. Importantly, minority group consciousness has been shown to result in more progressive political attitudes and greater political participation (Sanchez 2006) and a commitment to minority coalition building (McClain and Stewart 2006; McConnaughey et al. 2010). White-Blacks’ relatively stronger sense of minority group linked fate (compared to White-Asians), then, may induce them to engage with and support issues pertinent to their minority community to a much greater degree.

All told, our pattern of results may reflect multiracials’ greater regard for and psychological sense of solidarity with minority populations, in light of the minority status historically imparted upon them via exclusionary racial practices and legislation. But it is also likely due to multiracials’ recognition that others tend to categorize them with their non-white race (Ho et al., 2013), and that they may have little individual choice to identify themselves with anything other than their minority group. This could also explain why White-Blacks are sometimes distinctive compared to White-Asians, because White-Blacks face greater constraints when it comes to exiting their minority category (Davis, 2001).

Avenues for Future Research

Our study highlights additional paths for research. Race is not static but constructed and tethered to social context (Davenport, 2020). Although most mixed-race individuals self-classify consistently in different circumstances and points in time (Liebler et al., 2017), racial identities are, to some degree, flexible. Some people shift their identities to be more in step with their political views (Egan, 2020) and elite rhetoric that upholds or threatens a group’s distinctiveness can lead to fluctuations in members’ identity (Pérez, Deichert and Engelhardt, 2019). Identity
strength also matters for behavior; when their ingroup is denigrated, high identifiers seek to defend and affirm the group, whereas low identifiers spurn opportunities to defend their group and may dissociate themselves from it (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 2002). Moreover, group consciousness can materialize under certain political circumstances (Pérez, 2015); for example, how racial group political messages are framed can affect linked fate attitudes (Laird, 2019). It would be worthwhile to examine how the degree to which multiracials identify with their component racial groups may be strengthened or weakened, and how priming different racial backgrounds may affect their political loyalties.

In addition, perceived validation from other groups is relevant for how individuals experience group attachments. If their group membership is apparent to others, it will be more challenging for an individual to circumvent categorization with that group (Huddy, 2001). For people of mixed-race, self-classification is shaped by assumptions of how others view them; those who are phenotypically whiter are less likely to be categorized as minorities than their multiracial peers who look more like prototypical minorities (Khanna 2004). How such variation in appearance subsequently shapes multiracials’ group consciousness and racial attitudes are empirical questions that need examination.

**Conclusion**

The multiracial population is currently rising at a rate three times that of the overall U.S. population, and census estimates forecast that multiracials will continue to soar in size (Pew 2015; Mather et al. 2019). Examining the identities and attitudes of people who see themselves as belonging to multiple races helps clarify how identities are politicized in a diversifying America.

Our results indicate that White-Black and White-Asian Americans distinguish themselves from Whites and, on balance, align more with their racial minority background. Yet we also show
that, relative to their monoracial minority group, multiracials express lower levels of group closeness and race salience, and, in the case of White-Blacks, some implicit bias against Blacks. Taken together, this suggests a complexity to multiracials’ identities and points to a need to understand when and how multiracials’ differing attitudes affect their political behavior and preferences. When given the chance for thoughtful deliberation, are explicit racial attitudes more influential in explaining multiracials’ political decisions? Are implicit racial attitudes more powerful when it comes to political decisions that must be made more rapidly (Fazio and Olson, 2003)?

Our findings also raise questions about multiracials’ partisanship. In recent decades, racial minority groups have been drawn to the Democratic Party. For Blacks especially, Democratic support is near-unanimous, strengthened through Black social networks and institutions and constrained by strong group norms (White, Laird and Allen, 2014). Greater in-group contact increases the likelihood that Blacks identify as Democrat because Blacks hold each other accountable to collective group behavior (White and Laird, 2020). However, White-Blacks—who live in more racially diverse areas and are less engaged with some Black institutions, such as the Black church (Davenport, 2016)—may lack the same structures that informally govern Blacks’ political behavior, thus encountering less partisan constraint and more freedom to identify as non-Democrats. This is likely truer for White-Asians, given that Asians identify with the Democratic Party at lower rates than Blacks. Moreover, to the extent that minority group solidarity can be attributed to the tight boundaries around whiteness, if these boundaries loosen to include part-white multiracials, then such individuals may become less inclined to see themselves as minorities and political attachments to their minority race may weaken. If this occurs, then multiracial Americans may not necessarily gravitate toward the Democratic Party down the road.
At present, we think this is doubtful, given evidence of the general impermeability of whiteness to multiracials of Asian and Black heritage, even in the twenty-first century (Ho et al., 2011). Moreover, partisanship in the U.S. is increasingly associated with multiple and overlapping social categories (Westwood and Peterson, 2020; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) and partisan racial cleavages are more contentious than ever (Tesler, 2016). Since our survey was conducted, we have experienced the election and presidency of Donald Trump and his repeated denigration of people of color, as well as an avalanche of news reports focusing on police violence targeted at minorities, nationwide demonstrations in support of the Black Lives Matter movement, and a surge in hate incidents against Asian Americans. If anything, the elevated attention to race relations appears to be a persistent rather than a short-term trend. We thus think it likely that the identity distance between multiracials and Whites has only widened in this relatively charged racial environment.
References


Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana and Mark Hugo Lopez. 2015. “Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity, or Both?” *Pew Research Center Social and Demographic Trends*.


Table 1: Racial Identity by Racial Self-Classification (all results are percentages)

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(b) Closeness to Whites

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(e) Linked Fate to Whites

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(g) Linked Fate to Asians

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N 500 720 800 509 500
Figure 1: Effects of Racial Self-Classification on Relative Salience of Racial Identity to Personal Identity. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater relative salience of race to respondent's personal identity relative to other social identities. Bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are derived from the regression in Table B-1.
Figure 2: Closeness to Major Racial Groups. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived closeness to the target group. This figure shows post-estimation comparisons between racial groups and Whites accounting for controls. Bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are derived from the regressions in Table B-2.
Figure 3: Linked Fate to Major Racial Groups. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived linked fate to the target group. This figure shows post-estimation comparisons between racial groups and whites accounting for controls. Bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are derived from the regressions in Table B-3.

(a) Linked Fate To Whites (Relative to Whites)
White–Black
White–Asian

(b) Linked Fate To Blacks (Relative to Blacks)
White–Black

(c) Linked Fate To Asians (Relative to Asians)
White–Asian

Difference from Target Monoracial Group
Table 2: Racial Affect by Racial Self-Classification. Values represent weighted group means. Negative stereotype values indicate less favorable views toward the named racial group; higher racial resentment scores indicate more resentful attitudes; negative D-scores indicate more positive implicit biases towards the minority group.

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Figure 4: Explicit Racial Attitudes. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more positive stereotypes of the target group. Estimates are derived from the regressions in Table B-4.
Figure 5: Implicit Racial Attitudes. Higher values reflect more negative attitudes toward the relevant minority group: higher values on racial resentment indicate more negative views toward Blacks, while higher values on the White-Asian and White-Black BIAT indicate more negative views toward Asians and Blacks, respectively. Estimates are derived from the regressions in Table B-5.